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The History of Team Production Theory 
Ron Harris* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this short Essay, I consider the team production theory devel-
oped by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout1 from a historical perspec-
tive, in three senses. First, does the theory fit the historical use of the 
corporate form? Second, can it explain the development of corpora-
tion law doctrines? And third, can we place the development of the 
theory as such into the intellectual history of corporation theories at 
large? I will state my bottom line up front: while I find the team pro-
duction theory insightful and useful for my historical research, for 
teaching corporation law, and for thinking about contemporary cor-
porate problems, I am unable to position the theory in the three 
above-mentioned senses: the history of the corporation, the history of 
corporation law, and the history of the theory itself. 
In this Essay, I first consider the changing function of the cor-
poration. I argue that the corporate form has solved different prob-
lems in different periods and different contexts. I do not subscribe to 
the assertion that its main aim was or is to solve team production 
problems, but I do believe that in some cases this was its aim. I next 
discuss the history of legal doctrines and argue that the history of 
various corporate law doctrines does not support a coherent switch to 
doctrines that uphold the team production theory. At the time when 
some doctrines became more supportive of the theory, others under-
mined it. Third, and finally, I consider the intellectual history of cor-
                                                 
* Ron Harris is Dean and Professor of Law and Legal History, School of Law, Tel Aviv Uni-
versity. I would like to thank the participants of the Berle VI Symposium at the Seattle Uni-
versity School of Law for their invaluable comments and suggestions, the organizer of the 
conference, Chuck O’Kelley, for putting together such an impressive group of scholars with 
different perspectives on the topic, and to Sapir Glassman and Oriya Peretz for their excellent 
research assistance. 
 1. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
538 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:537 
poration theories. I argue that the theoretical discourse regarding the 
purpose of the corporation is not uniform. One cannot identify clear 
timing for the decline of other theories and for the rise of the team 
production theory. The team production theory and the agency theory 
coexist. As we shall see, they are designed to solve different prob-
lems, and, therefore, can coexist in different types of corporations. 
II. THE CHANGING FUNCTION OF CORPORATIONS 
Let us examine the problems encountered by entrepreneurs and 
investors in different historical periods and the solutions the corpora-
tion could offer to the various problems. In each of three historical 
periods, entrepreneurs and investors faced multiple, multi-
dimensional organizational problems. The problems appeared in a 
different mixture in different business contexts. Organizational law 
in general, and the corporation in particular, served as the solution to 
more than one problem. 
A. Business Organization in the Late Middle Ages 
To understand the modern corporation, we must begin with the 
pre-corporation period. Two main organizational forms were used in 
late medieval Europe for organizing multilateral enterprises. One was 
the compagnia partnership2 and the other was the commenda partner-
ship.3 I hold that each was more efficient than the other in solving a 
different problem. The commenda was good for solving agency prob-
lems, while the compagnia was good for solving team production 
problems. 
1. The Compagnia Partnership 
The compagnia developed out of the family business.4 Once this 
was expanded to include more remote relatives as well as employees, 
the family firm arrangement was somewhat formalized and legal-
ized.5 It was formalized as the forerunner of the general partnership.6 
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The term compagnia seems to come from the Latin “cumpanis”, 
meaning eating the same bread.7 This is indicative. The compagnia 
created strong social and economic ties among the partners.8 They 
were supposed to invest labor and to contribute their full time and 
efforts. In return, the compagnia provided for them and their fami-
lies.9 Ties were strengthened by intermarriage. The compagnia was 
common in inland towns.10 It was used mainly for artisanal and man-
ufacturing businesses. As I understand it, the bright-line rules that 
demanded exclusivity of the partners’ contribution to a single part-
nership, the physical proximity to enable fuller information, and the 
social ties to allow social sanctions, were all well geared to dealing 
with team production problems. That is, the organizational form of 
the compagnia was structured in a manner that mitigated shirking by 
partners. It could identify laziness—the preference for leisure over 
labor. It could punish this by deprivation of benefits and profits, and 
ultimately by ostracism.11 
2. The Commenda Partnership 
The commenda developed from employment and sea loan con-
tracts. It was the forerunner of the limited partnership. The basic 
commenda was a bilateral contract involving only two parties, a sed-
entary investing party and a traveling itinerant party. It was used in 
maritime trade. The commenda was an equity investment contract, 
specifying investments and payoffs. The investing party provided 
capital in the form of goods and cash used for the purchase of trade 
goods and for travel-related costs. The itinerant party typically did 
not invest capital. The traveling merchant controlled the pool of as-
sets invested by the investor and travelled with it to faraway ports or 
markets.12 The commenda was also a labor contract with the traveling 
party committing to invest labor, expertise, information, contacts, 
and bodily risk. The profits of the commenda were split between the 
two parties. In Italy, the investing party often received three-quarters 
of the net profits and the traveling party received one-quarter. The 
investor conveyed capital to a separate pool.13 In addition, the 
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commenda was also used in a multilateral version, typically when 
several investors invested in the same traveling party. But the fact 
that the commenda could be multilateral, and not only bilateral, does 
not refute its basic feature: having two classes of partners.14 
The main problem that the commenda meant to mitigate was 
agency, not team production. The itinerant party was geographically 
separated from the investing party; the itinerant party did not work 
under direct instructions or supervision.15 Each partner was required 
to produce different output, either capital or labor. Their contribu-
tions took a different form, different timing, and were made in dif-
ferent locations. No team production had to be dealt with. Rather, the 
main problem stemmed from the fact that the investor could not fully 
anticipate ex ante the circumstances, opportunities, and risks. There 
was a major information asymmetry problem to be dealt with. Solu-
tions included a clear mandate issued by the investor, a reporting ob-
ligation by the itinerant party, a fiduciary duty of the traveler to the 
investor, and an immunization of the investor from liability to the 
deeds of the traveler.16 
Both the compagnia and the commenda were developed in re-
sponse to the new needs stemming from the commercial revolution in 
the Italian towns of the late middle ages. In my view, they were fore-
runners of different versions of the partnership, the general and the 
limited. But the problems they were designed to mitigate were very 
different: team production for the compagnia and agency for the 
commenda. The ability to solve these different problems made them 
fit different types of business activities better: domestic manufactur-
ing for the compagnia and overseas trade for the commenda. 
B. Early Business Corporations 
In sixteenth-century England, corporations of various sorts were 
widespread. For example, organized corporations included the King 
himself, cities and boroughs, guilds, universities and colleges, hospi-
tals and other charitable institutions; bishops, deans, and chapters; 
and abbots, convents, and other ecclesiastical bodies. The business 
corporation, which emerged in England in the sixteenth century, was 
built on the old legal conception of the corporation that was first 
used in organizing churches, towns, universities, colleges, and 
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guilds.17 All these corporations, and others to a considerable degree, 
could be incorporated in the same pattern, enjoyed the same powers, 
capacities, and privileges, and were subject to the same remedies. 
The early joint-stock business corporation was not distinguisha-
ble in its legal framework from any other corporation of that era.18 
However, it combined the well-known legal conception of the corpo-
ration with the novel financial feature of joint stock. The joint-stock 
corporation, like the regulated corporation (a corporation modeled 
after the guild), and unlike other corporations, aimed at profit maxi-
mization. However, unlike the regulated corporation, the joint-stock 
corporation traded in only one account. That meant that members 
shared not only overheads, but also all the business activities of the 
corporation—all profits and losses. In this, the joint-stock corpora-
tion was somewhat similar to the general partnership. But while in-
terests in the joint-stock corporation were relatively freely transfera-
ble, they were not in the partnership. In addition to the feature of 
transferability of interests, the joint-stock corporation, like other cor-
porations but unlike partnerships, was also characterized by a sepa-
rate legal personality that ensured longevity and a hierarchical organ-
izational structure that enabled concentration of management in the 
hands of a governor and directors. Limitation of liability became an 
inherent feature of the joint-stock corporation only in the eighteenth 
century. Even without limited liability, the joint-stock corporation 
was fundamentally different from the partnership and substantially 
different in degree, if not in kind, from the regulated corporation. 
Did it intend to solve team production problems? The following ex-
amples will address this question. 
1. The East India Company 
The nature of the business of the East India Company (EIC)—
long-distance trade—was similar to that of the typical commenda, 
and so was its main organizational challenge.19 In September 1599, a 
                                                 
 17. RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION, 1720–1844, at 16–19 (2000) [hereinafter HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING]. 
 18. See id. at 16–19, 32–33, 39–46. Business corporations were mentioned only briefly 
in the major eighteenth-century treatise on corporations: STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1794). They are also briefly noted in the chapter on corporations in 
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *458–59, *462–64. 
 19. See Ron Harris, Law, Finance and the First Corporations, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE RULE OF LAW (James J. Heckman, Robert L. Nelson & Lee Cabatingan eds., 2009); 
Ron Harris, The Formation of the East India Company as a Cooperation-Enhancing Institu-
 
542 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:537 
group of London merchants, dominated by members of the Levant 
Company, who felt it was crucial for them to enter the Cape Route 
trade with Asia in the face of Portuguese and Dutch competition, 
held a number of meetings that in retrospect turned out to be the 
founding meetings of the English East India Company.20 The EIC 
was formed along two parallel tracks: one obtaining a Royal Charter 
that incorporated it as a corporate entity and permitted it to enter 
trade with new territories; and the other, raising equity capital for 
voyages to the East Indies from a large number of passive investors.21 
By employing these parallel tracks, the promoters of the EIC coupled 
the familiar legal structure of the corporation with the less familiar 
element of joint stock.22 
The EIC was formally incorporated as “one body corporate and 
politick” on December 31, 1600.23 It was initially formed as a trading 
company for a period of fifteen years.24 In fact, it lasted for more 
than 250 years and became the territorial governor of India. The 
charter of incorporation defined the basic governance structure of the 
EIC. This included a Governor, a Deputy Governor, a Committee of 
24—also called the “Court of Committees” (and after 1709, the 
“Court of Directors”)—and a General Court. The charter granted the 
EIC a trade monopoly.25 
The promoters of the EIC, and later its directors, were con-
cerned with raising capital for a very costly and risky business enter-
prise. But asymmetric information created a major obstacle to coop-
eration. To entice outsiders, the insiders could not rely only on pre-
senting the prospects of oceanic trade with Asia or promising a fair 
share of the profits. They had to credibly commit to provide infor-
mation that would reduce the asymmetry. They had to provide tools 
for acting upon the information. An institutional innovation was re-
quired to enable this and to raise vast capital from outsiders. Pairing 
the financial tool of equity investment in joint stock with the legal 
concept of the corporation represented a major innovation. The EIC 
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was designed institutionally as it was—coupling a corporation with a 
per-voyage equity financial investment—to facilitate cooperation 
between insiders and outsiders. To attract external investors, and in 
an attempt to offset the lack of liquidity in the absence of an effective 
market for shares in 1600 England, the EIC offered them voice. Fur-
ther, the EIC was designed in a manner that would allow its members 
an exit option despite the lack of a preexisting stock market.26 Mem-
bers of the EIC were given the option to invest, or not to invest, in 
any voyage after the first.27 In this sense, the corporation was a club 
of potential, though not necessarily actual, investors.28 
The EIC was a solution to the agency problem. It allowed out-
side investors with inferior access to information to monitor the in-
siders. It allowed the insiders to credibly commit not to expropriate, 
lock in, or massively cheat the passive outside investors. The EIC 
dealt with a problem not altogether different from the one dealt with 
by the commenda. Team production was not a major issue early on. 
The early EIC did not have other major constituencies. Creditors 
were almost absent. Employees were weak. Asian constituencies 
were not taken into account. The Board of Directors did not have to 
function as a mediating hierarchy. The Board had to assure outside 
investors that the insiders would not defraud them and would not use 
their money for purposes not agreed upon. It had to mediate between 
principals and agents. The agents—the insiders—were the producing 
team; the outsiders—the passive shareholders back in England—had 
no skills, no information, and no physical proximity to the team’s 
production. 
2. The Bank of England 
England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688 brought about political 
stability and commercial opportunities. But it also brought war with 
France and growing public expenses.29 To bridge the gap between 
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income taxation and wartime needs, the national debt was dramati-
cally increased in what is known as the Financial Revolution.30 There 
were calls for a national or public bank to encourage the propertied 
public to lend money to the state via an intermediary. The creditwor-
thiness of the new Dutch King, William III, was so low in London 
that it was impossible for the government to borrow the £1,200,000 
(at 8%) that it needed.31 To induce subscription to the loan, lenders 
were to be incorporated as the Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England (Bank), with long-term banking privileges including a cor-
porate monopoly on the issue of notes.32 In return for government 
bonds, the lenders subscribed to the equity stock of the new Bank of 
England, which in turn lent the Government cash.33 
Although the new bank risked its entire capital by lending it to 
the government in return for a Royal Charter, the subscription proved 
popular. The £1.2 million was raised in twelve days, lent to the gov-
ernment, and half was used to rebuild the navy.34 The Royal Charter 
was sealed on July 27, 1694, and the Bank began its role as the gov-
ernment’s banker and debt manager, which it continues doing to-
day.35 The Bank’s early years were dominated by the government’s 
pressing demands for finance and the issue of new coinage. The 
Bank also embarked upon conventional banking business.36 The 
Bank’s notes became a widely accepted currency;37 people seldom 
doubted that the “promise to pay”—which then referred to gold coin 
of the realm—would be honored. The Bank’s connection with the 
government, the scale of its private banking business, and the posi-
tion it held at the heart of the growing financial system of the City of 
London made the Bank a national treasure house and the leading 
commercial bank of the day. 
The main role of the Governor and the Board was not in the 
realm of mitigating agency problems and it was not in the realm of 
team production mediation. It was mostly in the realm of asset parti-
tioning.38 It was to ensure that the pool of assets was sufficient for 
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servicing the debt. They were not involved in production, but rather 
in demarcation and separation. They had to make sure that loans to 
the Crown would be in appropriate terms so that insolvency would 
not occur and shareholders’ investments would be protected.39 Insur-
ance companies that were formed during the eighteenth century had a 
similar function. These included the London Assurance and the Roy-
al Exchange Assurance, which were marine insurance joint-stock 
companies formed in 1720.40 Here again, the main role of the Board 
was monitoring pools of assets and demarcating the partitions be-
tween such pools. Syndicates such as the Lloyds for marine insur-
ance—in Lloyds Coffee Shop around 1730—and unincorporated in-
surance companies, such as Phoenix and Equitable Life Insurance 
(1756) and Phoenix Fire Insurance Company (1781), were formed.41 
These were not corporate entities; they did not have the privilege of 
limitation of liability, and they did not create a separate pool of as-
sets from those of their investors. 
3. Textile and Iron Firms 
Textiles and iron were the leading sectors of the first Industrial 
Revolution. They began to revolutionize technologically in the 1760s 
and 1770s.42 New technologies in spinning and weaving, such as the 
spinning jenny, the spinning mule, the water frame, and eventually, 
the cotton mill, changed the cotton industry forever.43 Similarly, the 
blast furnace, hot blast, and other improvements in machines and 
processes increased the productivity and quality of the iron indus-
try.44 The firms in these leading sectors grew in size from domestic 
cottage industries, to more capitalist putting-out systems, and even-
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tually to factories and town factories. These firms were team produc-
tion firms, much like the Italian compagnias of earlier centuries. 
Their teams involved inventors, entrepreneurs, cotton and iron sup-
pliers, credit providers, laborers, production floor managers, whole-
salers and retailers, and supporting communities. Nevertheless, tex-
tiles and iron were organized throughout the Industrial Revolution—
a full century—in the form of family firms and partnerships.45 Team 
production problems in these leading and crucial sectors were ad-
dressed without resort to the corporation as a form of organization. 
4. Railway Companies 
The railway sector followed the path paved by the canal compa-
nies in the eighteenth century and, from its origins, was wholly based 
on the joint-stock form.46 It made a slow start in the early 1820s with 
the world’s first steam-powered public line, the Stockton & Darling-
ton Railway.47 But it really gathered momentum only after the com-
pletion of the thirty-mile long Liverpool and Manchester Railway in 
1830.48 New company formations peaked in two boom periods, one 
between 1834 and 1837—with the formation of 88 companies—and 
the other beginning in 1843 and culminating toward the end of the 
decade.49 Altogether, 216 Railway Acts passed in Parliament between 
1820 and 1844.50 The total capital of railway companies traded in 
London was over £57 million in 1843.51 Between 1830 and 1850, 
some 6,000 miles of public railway were built in Britain, in what is 
known as the Railway Mania.52 By 1850, the annual number of pas-
sengers transported reached 68 million, and by 1870, it had reached 
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322 million.53 This was the fastest growth any economic sector had 
ever experienced.54 
From the start, the railway companies were very big. Network 
considerations led to a very rapid merger movement. The Liverpool 
& Manchester Railway opened to the public in 1830.55 The Grand 
Junction Railway from Warrington to Birmingham was incorporated 
in 1833 and opened in 1837.56 In 1845, it merged with the Liverpool 
& Manchester Railway. The line then merged with the London and 
Birmingham Railway (opened 1838) and the Birmingham and Man-
chester Railway to form the London and North Western Railway on 
1846.57 It grew on a colossal scale, never before seen, due to the rap-
id growth of the sector as a whole and the mergers of the railway 
companies. By the middle of the nineteenth century, it had capital in 
the millions of pounds, tens of thousands of shareholders, nearly a 
thousand miles of rails with dozens of stations, hundreds of locomo-
tives, thousands of carriages, tens of thousands of employees, and 
millions of passengers.58 
Companies like the London and Northwestern Railway had 
many constituencies, including shareholders of ordinary and pre-
ferred shares, bondholders, adjacent landowners, passengers, freight 
customers, constructors, suppliers and service providers, executives, 
engineers, drivers, maintenance workers, salespersons, tort claimants, 
and many other types of employees, accountants, lawyers, and 
more.59 According to Chandler, the large British and American rail-
ways were the first modern business enterprises.60 The directors of 
these giant railway companies did not deal with bilateral agency 
problems or with the management of separate pools of assets. They 
primarily coordinated highly complex team production projects. 
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They could potentially mediate conflicting claims and interests with-
in this diverse enterprise. 
During the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, sev-
eral major legal systems divided the corporate form into two separate 
forms: public corporations and private companies. Though both 
forms share some common features, they also had distinctive features 
that made each of them more amenable to solving different problems. 
In Continental Europe, the legislatures created separate laws for pri-
vate companies, which formed the two legal forms. Germany led the 
way in 1892 by introducing the GmbH.61 France, inspired by the an-
nexation of Alsace-Lorraine (with GmbHs) in 1918, introduced the 
SARL in 1925.62 In Britain, the split was achieved within the same 
piece of legislation—the 1907 Companies Act.63 After the 1862 
Companies Act, private companies began to develop from below, by 
businesspersons and lawyers, using the contractual flexibility offered 
by the Act and its default Table A bylaws.64 The courts first recog-
nized the private company in the famous Salomon v. Salomon House 
of Lords decision in 1897.65 Later, the Companies Acts of 1900 and 
1907 formally recognized the status of private companies.66 General-
ly speaking, private companies gained increased governance flexibil-
ity, lower public disclosure requirements, and less formal procedures 
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in return for giving up the access to stock markets and to external 
equity.67 
Thus, the organizational menu in Germany, Britain, and France 
expanded to include at least two options. Different firms seeking to 
solve different problems selected either the private or the public cor-
poration form, or remained sole proprietorships or partnerships. The 
GmbH, Private Company, SARL, and LLC options were often incor-
porated for asset partitioning purposes or in order to solve intergen-
erational issues or control problems between shareholders.68 They do 
not seem to fit the team production theory and, at least in some of 
their manifestations, they fit agency theory. 
The above examples demonstrate that the joint-stock business 
corporation could be used to deal with three different problems: 
agency in the case of the East India Company, asset partitioning in 
the case of the Bank of England, and team production in the case of 
the giant railway companies. Furthermore, two different organiza-
tional forms could deal with team production: family firms in the 
case of textile and iron factories, and business corporations in the 
case of railways. But the fact that the team production problem was 
relevant for some corporations in the second half of the nineteenth 
century does not mean that corporate boards were mediating it. The 
existence of a problem was a necessary, but not a sufficient condi-
tion. Boards needed the status, legal powers, and motivation to medi-
ate. 
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III. DOCTRINAL HISTORY 
Let us move from the history of the corporate form in solving 
organizational problems to the legal history of specific corporate 
structures and doctrines. For the team production theory to validly 
explain the functioning of corporate boards as mediating hierarchies, 
we must establish a few supporting doctrines. Doctrinal develop-
ments could lead to a theoretical shift. Conversely, a paradigm shift 
from one theory, say agency, to another, say team production, could 
enhance doctrinal change. Each can nourish the other simultaneously. 
Did specific doctrines that support the team production develop be-
fore, in tandem, or after the formulation of the theory? To help an-
swer this question, I will examine the doctrinal examples of separate 
legal personality, the trust doctrine, and the business judgment rule, 
which Blair and Stout offered in their seminal 1999 article.69 
A. Separate Legal Personality  
First, separate legal personality emerged.70 For directors not to 
hold their full alliance to members, they needed another anchor—the 
corporate entity. This separate legal personality developed as a key 
characteristic of the corporation as early as the Middle Ages. New 
College, mentioned in the Stout article, and the East India Company 
are examples of the early corporations with a distinct legal personali-
ty. The corporation’s separate legal personality received its starkest 
modern form in Salomon v. Salomon in 1897.71 This case recognized 
in England the separation between a sole shareholder, who was also a 
creditor, and the company in which he held shares.72 The case was 
decided in the context of all private companies and at a time when 
boards were considered to represent shareholders.73 Historically, le-
gal personality was in place long before the team production theory 
became viable. 
Corporations in the second half of the nineteenth century were 
not structured in a way that allowed the board of directors to serve as 
mediators between stakeholders. This was primarily because board 
members were expected to be major shareholders and not independ-
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ent directors. Most public companies had relatively high qualification 
requirements for directors in terms of minimum holdings of shares. 
Directors were viewed as representing the shareholders and, as such, 
were expected to be shareholders themselves.74 Late nineteenth cen-
tury directors were considered to be agents of corporate sharehold-
ers.75 As representatives and agents of the shareholders, directors 
could not serve as honest brokers. The dominant corporate personali-
ty theory of the time, the contractual or aggregate theory, put the ul-
timate controlling power of the corporation in the hands of the share-
holders and equated the corporation with its shareholders.76 But this 
too did not make the board the pivotal organ of the corporation. 
Boards of directors did not attain this status until the merger move-
ment at the turn of the twentieth century weakened the stance of 
shareholders in their corporations and empowered directors. Howev-
er, this process was lengthy and gradual, and it may have resulted, in 
part, from the managers’ desire to escape from the control of share-
holders. 
B. The Trust Doctrine 
According to the trust doctrine, the legal relationship between 
directors and shareholders is similar to the legal relationship between 
trustees and beneficiaries.77 The trust doctrine was first applied to 
officers of unincorporated companies in the late eighteenth century 
because they used the trust as a basic device for holding property on 
behalf of their shareholders. The trust doctrine migrated to the corpo-
rate context and was applied to directors and officers in the middle of 
the nineteenth century.78 Thus, from an early stage, directors were 
committed to serving the interests of shareholders, like trustees to 
beneficiaries. As long as this was the state of doctrine, directors 
could not serve as mediators, even when they were not required to 
own shares for board qualification. 
                                                 
 74. This rationale goes back to the very first business corporations, such as the East 
India Company and its contemporaries. 
 75. HORWITZ, supra note 73. 
 76. Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality 
Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Busi-
ness, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1462–78 (2006). 
 77. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 290–92. 
 78. HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING, supra note 17, at 137–67. 
552 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:537 
C. The Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule developed gradually.79 The shield-
ing of managerial decisions from judicial review during the lifetime 
of the enterprise first developed in Britain in the equitable context of 
partnerships, and made its way into the corporate context as early as 
1843 in Foss v. Harbottle.80 This was an important first step in allow-
ing directors a level of independence from shareholders. 
The business judgment rule is an essential doctrine in the Unit-
ed States that can detach directors from shareholders. It gives direc-
tors immunity from shareholder intervention in decisions that favor 
other constituencies. The history of the business judgment rule in the 
United States still awaits a complete study of its origins. Yet we can 
point to some significant cases. For example, the business judgment 
rule was quite clearly stated as early as 1919 in Dodge v. Ford.81 In 
the Unocal case of 1985, the court held that a board of directors may 
only try to prevent a takeover where it can be shown that there was a 
threat to corporate policy.82 In other words, the court was willing to 
review the decision of a board in these circumstances, despite the 
general applicability of the business judgment rule.83 In Van Gorkom, 
also decided in 1985, the court found that the directors were grossly 
negligent because they hastily approved a merger without substantial 
inquiry or any expert advice.84 Though a well-developed business 
judgment rule is a precondition for the application of the mediating 
hierarchies theory, as Blair and Stout suggest, the timing of its de-
velopment is not clear.85 
As can be seen, different doctrines developed in different times. 
Therefore, the doctrinal history does not define any specific period 
when all the doctrinal pieces necessary to team production theory 
matured. Let us move from the history of the doctrine to the history 
of the theory itself. 
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IV. DYNAMICS OF CORPORATION THEORIES 
Three preconditions are needed for the theory of team produc-
tion to develop. First, corporations had to encounter team production 
problems. Second, legal doctrine had to support the theory, for ex-
ample, by positioning boards in a legal position in which they could 
serve as mediators. Third, the previously dominant theory of the cor-
poration, agency theory, had to be sufficiently undermined. In this 
Part, we will follow the history of the team production theory of the 
corporation and the theories that competed with it, primarily agency 
theory. Let us begin in the early twentieth century, because before 
that time the other preconditions were not met. 
The canonic 1919 Dodge v. Ford case does not fit a mediating 
board conception of the corporation.86 The issue was whether Henry 
Ford and the board he controlled could promote a business strategy 
that benefited consumers of Model T automobiles (by lowering its 
price) and employees of the Ford Motor Company (by paying premi-
um wages) at the expense of shareholders (the plaintiffs were large 
shareholders).87 The Michigan Supreme Court stated in a very fa-
mous quote: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to 
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be ex-
ercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not 
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, 
or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order 
to devote them to other purposes.88 
This judgment upheld a shareholder value conception of the company 
and undermined a conception that took into account the interests of 
various other stakeholders.89 
In the early 1930s, the Berle–Dodd debate about shareholder 
versus stakeholder views of the firm raged, mostly in the pages of the 
Harvard Law Review.90 The parties to the debate were two of the 
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corporate law luminaries of the time: Adolf Berle, at the time profes-
sor at Columbia Law School, and Merrick Dodd, then a Harvard Law 
School professor.91 The Berle–Dodd controversy concerned the pri-
mary purpose of the publicly owned corporation. 
Berle’s position was, in a nutshell, “that all powers granted to a 
corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group 
within the corporation, whether derived from statute or charter or 
both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable 
benefit of all shareholders . . . .”92 Dodd, on the other hand, argued 
that since the corporation was viewed as a separate legal entity, the 
directors were fiduciaries of the corporation and not of the share-
holders, and as such, had to take into account other constituencies 
and stakeholders and the society at large.93 
We do not have to delve deeper into the arguments in the de-
bate. It is sufficient for our purposes to establish that in the early 
1930s there was a harsh debate between two paradigms and not dom-
inance of a single paradigm. The first paradigm was the agency para-
digm, according to which the main role of corporation law is to miti-
gate agency problems between shareholders and directors. The se-
cond is our very own team production paradigm. Not only did one of 
the two paradigms—the shareholder primacy paradigm—not support 
a team production theory of the corporation, but it also promoted its 
competitor. 
A team production model of the firm may have appeared with 
“managerialism,” a concept that emerged in the 1930s and experi-
enced a heyday in the 1950s and 1960s.94  At the core of 
managerialism was the belief that large corporations were not only 
rapidly growing to become, or already were, dominant economic and 
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social institutions, but also that they were being run by a new kind of 
controller.95 Both optimistic and pessimistic views of managerialism 
pointed to corporate managers as a central element in the new sys-
tem.96 In the immediate postwar period, Peter Drucker wrote about 
the internal life of corporate management and the need for a business 
corporation to have “management whose responsibility is to the en-
terprise rather than to any one group: owners, workers, or consum-
ers.”97 James Burnham’s work, The Managerial Revolution, sought to 
express the movement of all functional power into the hands of man-
agers rather than politicians or businessmen.98 He viewed corporate 
managers as a new class in society, supplanting the capitalists of a 
previous era.99 
The evidence suggests that, at least in their public pronounce-
ments, corporate leaders voiced managerial views. Clearly, many 
business leaders accepted some or all of the economic underpinnings 
of managerialism. The idea became widespread in the postwar era, as 
corporate leaders were increasingly depicted as balancing the de-
mands of various corporate constituencies, including employees, 
communities, consumers, and society in general.100 This was the first 
time a fertile breeding ground for developing a team production theo-
ry of the corporation was in place. But in his famous 1970 New York 
Times essay, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its 
Profits, Milton Friedman stated in the most direct and powerful way 
that: 
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate execu-
tive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct 
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct 
the business in accordance with their desires, which generally 
will be to make as much money as possible . . . .101 
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Friedman was, at the time, one of the most influential economists 
globally, a leader of the Chicago School of Economics, a prominent 
public figure and columnist, and soon to become a Nobel laureate.102 
Considering Friedman’s strong criticism, clearly the team production 
theory was still not the dominant theory of the 1970s. Or alternative-
ly, it was already past its heyday. 
Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article on agency cost theory was 
another challenge.103 The theory placed the agency relationship be-
tween shareholders and managers, in the center of the analysis of the 
corporation.104 It analyzed monitoring costs, bonding costs, and re-
sidual loss.105 What is important for our context is the reception the 
article received, not its details. The article became one of the most 
cited articles in the field of economics.106 In the following four dec-
ades, it became one of the most canonic and influential articles in the 
field of theory of the firm. 
So far we have examined a few anecdotes along the twentieth 
century, in which we encountered the persistence of agency theory 
and its resistance to alternative theories. Let us use another method—
a more continuous one—for looking at the rise and decline of major 
twentieth century paradigms of firm and corporate theory. The meth-
od is citation counting. In this case, it is based on Google Books.107 
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Let us understand the graphs. The first graph compares occur-
rence of team production theory and asset partitioning. We can see 
that until the 2000s, the team production theory occurred more fre-
quently. At the beginning of the 2000s, although the occurrence of 
the team production theory kept rising steadily, asset partitioning 
held prominence. At the end of the decade, the occurrence of asset 
partitioning dropped dramatically.  
The second graph compares occurrence of team production the-
ory and agency theory. It is clear that throughout the time period, 
agency theory appears much more frequently than team production 
theory. 
I am not sure how Blair and Stout would view the intellectual 
history of thinking about team production theory. Did the theory en-
joy a golden age between the 1930s and 1970s, during the heyday of 
managerialism, and decline thereafter? Did the agency paradigm rise 
to dominance for the first time after the seminal 1976 Jensen and 
Meckling article to replace the seasoned team production theory? Or 
did agency theory dominate throughout the twentieth century, with 
team production theory of the corporation emerging for the first time 
only very late in the century, in the 1990s, as Blair and Stout suggest 
in their seminal article?108 As Blair and Stout note, several indica-
tions support their view.109 But there is also evidence of a different 
trend. For example, Bebchuk’s Shareholder Rights Project at Harvard 
and other shareholder democracy movements suggest the persistence 
or reemergence of shareholder primacy and the agency-focused theo-
ry of the corporation.110 Or have agency theory and mediating hierar-
chies theory competed with each other throughout the century, with 
some ups and downs? 
V. CONCLUSION 
The team production theory surely could not develop, even ini-
tially, before actual corporations dealt with team production prob-
lems. Theorizing problems such as this was not likely to occur before 
the occurrence of the problem itself. As we saw in the first section, 
the first complex multistakeholder corporations—the first corpora-
tions to encounter team production problems on a large scale—were 
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the railway companies. The next wave emerged from the Second In-
dustrial Revolution, which gave rise to the steel, chemical, and auto-
mobile industries. These were the first large public industrial corpo-
rations. Before that period, most industrial firms that encountered 
team production problems were not incorporated, as we saw in the 
survey of the textile and iron industries, and dealt with the team pro-
duction problem through other organizational means. Textile and iron 
corporations involved in team production actually developed after the 
middle of the nineteenth century, giant railway companies in the 
third quarter of that century, and large industrial companies in the 
fourth. But even then, not all public corporations experienced team 
production problems as existential issues. Some, like the commenda 
and the East India Company in their times, viewed agency problems 
as their main concern. Many twentieth-century banking, financial, 
and insurance companies, like the Bank of England, and the London 
Assurance earlier, viewed asset partitioning and the management of 
pools of assets and liabilities as their main tasks. We have also seen 
that the various types of private companies that developed since the 
late nineteenth century as an organizational form—distinct from the 
public corporation—did not primarily aim to solve team production 
problems. 
Doctrinal and structural histories do not point to any well-
defined period as the one when all the doctrinal pieces necessary to 
team production theory matured. Some of the doctrines, notably sep-
arate legal personality, were in place by the late middle ages but nev-
ertheless did not give rise to the team production theory. Some, like 
the structural independence of the board, developed only in the first 
half of the twentieth century. Yet others, such as the business judg-
ment rule, experienced ups and downs until the 1980s and beyond. 
Does one expect doctrine to change first from below, followed intui-
tively by, for instance, Delaware judges, and only then to be fol-
lowed by the development of an organizing theory by academics such 
as Blair and Stout? Or do we expect theory to change first and then 
the courts to settle disputes and develop the common law based on 
the theory as an organizing rationale? 
The intellectual history of the two competing theories, agency 
and team production, over the twentieth century is quite complex. 
What I did in this Essay was offer only a very narrow narrative based 
on a few familiar manifestations, not a thick intellectual history 
based on thorough research. Based on this sketch, it seems as though, 
rather than witnessing a single, one-directional paradigm shift from 
team production to agency, or vice versa, we are in fact witnessing 
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an ongoing competition between two theories, two paradigms. The 
Great Depression led to a major debate as to the social and economic 
role of the business corporation. The heyday of managerialism in the 
postwar period could have given rise to team production theory, but 
it did not. The growing criticism of executives and of the actual 
achievements of agency theory in the 1990s and 2000s did give rise 
to team production theory, but did not lead to the demise of agency 
theory. 
To conclude, I would like to put forward three arguments. I 
would like to urge Blair and Stout and other scholars examining this 
issue to provide a more precise historical narrative of the timing and 
causes of the development of the mediating hierarchies theory and its 
supporting doctrines. For now, and based on my preliminary histori-
cal study, I would like to put forward the hypothesis that agency the-
ory and team production theory have existed in parallel for much of 
the past century. 
I would like to suggest that business organizations are highly 
heterogeneous and the problems addressed by their entrepreneurs and 
investors change over time and among sectors and contexts. The pub-
lic corporation is an institution that can and does solve more than one 
problem. Team production, agency, and asset partitioning problems 
can all be mitigated by differently functioning and differently struc-
tured corporations. Consequently, it appears that the team production 
model is very insightful for understanding what is going on in some 
corporations, but not in others. 
The normative question of whether it is efficient and desirable 
from a social engineering perspective to use the same organizational 
form—the business corporation—to solve different problems, namely 
agency, team production, and asset partitioning, is still very much 
open in my judgment. On one hand, because the corporation is used 
more often and it is deployed to solve several problems, many play-
ers invest in the development of the business corporation. Network 
externalities are being created. On the other hand, one size does not 
fit all. There are rigidities. There are advantages to having a menu of 
options, different platforms for private and public corporations, for 
shareholder-controlled and for director-mediated corporations. May-
be different organizational forms could be designed to better solve 
different organizational problems. A systematic normative analysis 
will have to await another opportunity. 
 
